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Homophily, or “love for similar others,” has been shown to play a fundamental role in the
formation of interpersonal ties and social networks. Yet no study has investigated whether
perceived similarities can affect tacit coordination. We had 68 participants attempt to
maximize real monetary earnings by choosing between a safe but low paying option
(that could be obtained with certainty) and a potentially higher paying but “risky” one,
which depended on the choice of a matched counterpart. While making their choices
participants were mutually informed of whether their counterparts similarly or dissimilarly
identified with three person-descriptive words as themselves. We found that similarity
increased the rate of “risky” choices only when the game required counterparts to match
their choices (stag hunt games). Conversely, similarity led to decreased risk rates when
they were to tacitly decouple their choices (entry games). Notably, though similarity
increased coordination in the matching environment, it did not did not increase it in the
decoupling game. In spite of this, similarity increased (expected) payoffs across both
coordination environments. This could shed light on why homophily is so successful
as a social attractor. Finally, this propensity for matching and aversion to decoupling
choices was not observed when participants “liked” their counterparts but were dissimilar
to them. We thus conclude that the impact of similarity of coordination should not be
reduced to “liking” others (i.e., social preferences) but it is also about predicting them.
Keywords: coordination, similarity, homophily, economic games, social preferences, social cognition
Introduction
“Any event in the history of the organism is, in a sense, unique. Consequently, recognition, learning,
and judgment presuppose an ability to categorize stimuli and classify situations by similarity. As
Quine (1969) puts it: “There is nothing more basic to thought and language than our sense of
similarity; our sorting of things into kinds” (Tversky and Gati, 1978).
So many of our decisions are “social”: their outcomes depend on the decisions of others. This
can generate “strategic uncertainty” (VanHuyck et al., 1990) and require agents to infer what others
will do, while others do the same, in order to decide optimally.
Consider for instance the decision of joining a strike or a rebellion: all may know that if enough
people join in the uprising, it will succeed, and everyone will benefit. However, rebelling in small
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numbers could be dangerous, so agents might hesitate to do so.
Similarly, investing in a new technology might only worthwhile
if enough others do the same, so it becomes the new standard
and everyone profits. In such situations, two outcomes would
do: “either all rebel/invest, or no one does,” but isolated actions
are costly. Consequently, agents should attempt to match their
choices.
Conversely, there are many situations in which choosing the
same options can be disadvantageous, especially when resources
cannot be shared. For instance, many markets can only provide
revenue to a limited number of investors, because if too many do
there will be a “price war,” and everyone loses (Camerer, 2003).
Ormoremundanely, driving space is limited, so a driver deciding
whether to enter the freeway around rush hour might only do
so if he convinces himself that not too many others will do the
same, since if too many do, there will be a traffic jam1. In these
situations, agents would prefer to decouple their choices, such that
“either I take the free-way/enter the market and you don’t, or vice
versa; but we shouldn’t enter together.”
In economics, the first class of situations are said to
involve strategic complements, while the latter involve strategic
substitutes (Bulow et al., 1985; Camerer and Fehr, 2006)2. In both
cases however, when communication is impossible or inefficient3
(Morris and Shin, 2002; Heinemann et al., 2004), agentsmust find
some “tacit agreement” on how to coordinate their choices.
Game theory is a standard approach to understanding
interdependent decision problems (henceforth, “games”), and
it is frequent practice in economics and political science to
use it to provide strategic advice to investors, firms, or nations
(Schelling, 1960; Gibbons, 1992). However, when it comes to a
certain subset of interactions, namely “coordination problems”
like the ones sketched above, game theory turns strikingly blind.
This occurs because game theory fundamentally derives its
predictions by applying deduction to the incentives and options
of a given situation. Indeed, out of all the possible outcomes
of an interaction, there is only a subset of them, called “Nash
equilibria,” in which no agent has an incentive to “move further,”
that is, to unilaterally deviate from his/her current choice. The
fundamental problem with coordination games is that they have
multiple Nash equilibria, and standard game theory provides no
clear criteria for equilibrium selection4. Indeed, coordination has
1Analogously, in conceited arguments, everyone would like to get their message
through first, though if everyone tries to do so at the same time, no one succeeds,
because attentional resources are limited. Or, in emergencies, everyone would tend
to rush through the fire exit, though overcrowding it would only make things
worse.
2Related measures have been proposed in terms of game “difficulty” (Rapoport,
1967), indexes of “correspondence” (Kelley and Thibaut, 1978), or game
“harmony” (Zizzo and Tan, 2007).
3Camerer (2003) provides a number of real-life examples in which coordination
is required but communication isn’t possible. Furthermore, even when
communication is possible, it doesn’t completely resolve “matching problems”
(Cooper et al., 1992) and it has even been shown to potentially complicate
“decoupling” ones (Cooper et al., 1989; Ellingsen and Östling, 2010). Notably, if
words have slightly different meanings to different people (i.e., different cultures),
communication can also lead to incomprehension and conflict (Weber and
Camerer, 2003).
4Though see Harsanyi and Selten (1988) or Carlsson and Van Damme (1993) for
important game theoretic refinements on coordination.
been said to constitute “the hardest problem of game theory”
(Camerer, 2003).
Here, we investigated how coordination is affected by
perceived interpersonal similarities. Indeed, homophily, or “love
for similar others,” is one of the most strikingly ubiquitous
predictors of interpersonal attraction and network formation in
social species, as it has been observed across ages (i.e., Meltzoff,
2007; Over et al., 2013), cultures (Apicella et al., 2012) and
species (i.e., Seyfarth and Cheney, 2012; Massen and Koski,
2014). Indeed, similarity along a wide variety of dimensions
such as age, ethnicity, class, religion, personality and interests
has been shown to shape friendship formation, partner selection
and social networks in human adults (see McPherson et al.,
2001 for a review)5. Correspondingly, a number of theoretical
models have implicated similarity in the formation of friendship
(Currarini et al., 2009) or the evolution of cooperation (Riolo
et al., 2001); and simulations have shown how, in repeated
cooperation dilemmas, agents that rely on a “perceived similarity
index” can drive groups of stochastic or hostile “free-riders” to
extinction, even if in minority (Fischer et al., 2013). Finally,
studies have begun to emphasize the impact of similarity on
coordination (Cole and Teboul, 2004; Fischer, 2009; Fu et al.,
2012). Yet in spite of this mounting evidence, no study has
empirically assessed whether coordination is actually affected by
perceived interpersonal similarities.
Furthermore, no study has systematically compared the
impact of similarity on the two opposite “declinations” of
coordination illustrated above, namely matching (strategic
compliments) and decoupling choices (strategic substitutes). In
fact, common intuition suggests that similarity should generally
decrease social uncertainty, plausibly because all else being equal,
similar agents can use “their ownminds” as a proxy to predict the
choices of their counterpart. Indeed, this is in line with abundant
experimental evidence showing that, even in the absence of
similarity-related cues (and since childhood) social inferences
are often contaminated by one’s own thoughts and perspectives
(i.e., Ross et al., 1977; Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen
et al., 1985; Keysar, 1994; Gilovich et al., 1998, 2000; Goldman,
2006)6, and that perceived interpersonal similarities accentuate
the degree to which this occurs (Clement and Krueger, 2002;
Ames, 2004; Epley et al., 2004; Robbins and Krueger, 2005)7.
The problem is that being more predictable might indeed
help in environments that require agents to match their choices,
but it might even be detrimental when agents are to somehow
“outsmart” one another and decouple their choices. For instance,
in competitive environments similar agents might find it harder
5Eric Fischer’s city maps are a particularly compelling demonstration of ethnicity-
based homophily (https://www.flickr.com/photos/walkingsf/4981444199/in/set-
72157624812674967) (though distinguishing homophilic aggregation from
segregation might not be straightforward).
6One notorious instance of this is the “false-consensus effect” (see Marks and
Miller, 1987 for a review); though see also Goldman (2006); Goldman (in particular
Chapter 7) for a survey of all the (“high-level” mind-reading) domains in which
subjects have been shown to attribute their own perspectives and knowledge to
others.
7Intriguingly, humans have even been shown to recruit the same neural structures
when answering questions about themselves and similar, but not dissimilar others
(Mitchell et al., 2006; Jenkins et al., 2008).
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to manipulate or lie to one another, thus similarity might
deter them from attempting to do so. Or one could think
of the paradigmatic form of interpersonal similarity, namely,
monozygotic twins. In fact, twins have been shown to more
frequently match their choices in cooperation dilemmas (Segal
and Hershberger, 1999), however, what would happen if they
were to play a game like “rock, paper, scissors”?8 The same
similarity that helped them in the first scenario, might work
against them in the latter, and Fischer (2009) nicely illustrates this
problem with a mental experiment involving agents “playing”
with their “mirror image.” Indeed, though it has been previously
conjectured (Fischer, 2009; Fu et al., 2012; Krueger et al., 2012)
that similarity could affect coordination in opposite ways, this has
been never empirically demonstrated.
However, and importantly, similarity doesn’t only alter social
inferences. In fact, traditionally, it is mainly held to mediate
interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971; McPherson et al., 2001;
Montoya et al., 2008 for a review), thus moderating social
attitudes and affect. In this sense, attraction for similar others
could hinge on very basic and relatively “non-inferential”
mechanisms (Zajonc, 1980; Mitchell et al., 2006) such as the
“mere exposure” effect (see Zajonc, 2001 for review), which
consists in the observation that simple repeated exposure to
previously neutral stimuli increases their perceived attractiveness
(Monahan et al., 2000)9.
Indeed, many effects of similarity on interactions could be
potentially be explained by “social preference” theories (i.e., Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2003; or Camerer, 2003 for a review), which are
fundamentally different from the ones described above. In fact,
proponents of a “similarity approach” (Ames, 2004; Fischer, 2009;
Krueger et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2013) usually refer to its impact
on inferences and uncertainty, while social preferences, if taken
rigorously, leave inferences untouched, and explain cooperation
in terms, for instance, of “altruistic” motives (i.e., Van Lange,
1999). The difference is that in the latter case, subjects might be
willing to incur more costs to benefit those they like rather than
dislike (i.e., Jones and Rachlin, 2006), thus choosing the options
that most benefit similar rather than dissimilar others.
Intriguingly, alternative evolutionary approaches to
homophily seem to parallel this dichotomy (albeit naturally
at a much more distal level). For instance, in line with a
“preference” approach to similarity, a commonly quoted
evolutionary basis for homophily is kinship selection (Hamilton,
1963), the notion that agents may have an incentive to benefit
others proportionally to their genetic relatedness. Indeed, by
helping relatives, agents promote the survival of the portion of
genes they share with them. Similarity could then be involved
in distinguishing kin from non-kin. For instance phenotypic
8Notably, in notorious social dilemmas such as prisoner’s dilemmas or public good
games, cooperators aim to match their choices with their counterparts, while “free-
riders” aim to decouple them. Indeed, many studies have stressed the strong link
between cooperation and coordination (Dawes et al., 1977; Messé and Sivacek,
1979; Kollock, 1998a,b; Hayashi et al., 1999; Camerer, 2003). Consequently, if
similarity has an effect on coordination, this could carry over to cooperation
dilemmas (Fischer, 2009; Krueger et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2013).
9Even newly hatched chicks have been shown to move toward a tone they had
prenatally been exposed to rather than novel tones (Rajecki, 1974).
matching (Porter, 1987)—that is, the implicit evaluation of
relatedness based on phenotypic similarity—has been observed
in ground squirrels (Holmes and Sherman, 1982), baboons
(Alberts, 1999), rhesus monkeys, and a number of other species.
In line with this, DeBruine (2002) showed that economic trust
was increased when human agents played with a fictive player
whose face had been morphed to physically resemble their own.
Intriguingly, even genotypic homophily has been reported in
humans (Fowler et al., 2011; Christakis and Fowler, 2014), such
that friends are more likely to have similar genes, plausibly as
a consequence of their seeking others with similar phenotypes.
Importantly, kin-selection based explanations of homophily
imply that individuals needn’t directly benefit from similarity, if
anything, their genes do.
On the other hand, different evolutionary approaches related
to homophily seem to stress its predictive or strategic component,
rather than its motivational one (Fu et al., 2012; Fischer
et al., 2013). For instance, Vallortigara and Rogers (2005),
were concerned by the fact that selection pressures on the
individual cannot explain the fact that, at the population level,
the great majority of vertebrates exhibit functional lateralization
in proportions that are different from 1/2. For instance,
there is no clear fitness advantage of being right or left-
handed, yet humans are most frequently right-handed. The
authors show how this might emerge as an evolutionary stable
strategy when asymmetric organisms must coordinate their
behavior with other asymmetric organisms of the same species
(Ghirlanda and Vallortigara, 2004). Intriguingly, there is some
evidence that species that are “less social” also exhibit less
population-level lateralization (Vallortigara and Bisazza, 2002).
In apparent contrast to kin-selection, homophily under this
approach more clearly benefits both actors and counterparts,
because it is the solution to a fundamental coordination
problem (in this case, functional lateralization) stemming from
the necessity to predict behavior Vallortigara and Rogers
(2005).
However, similarity and liking seem deeply intertwined10, so
we also asked what aspect of similarity may have an impact on
coordinated behavior; or differently put, is similarity just one
among the many mediators of social attraction, or is there some
additional strategic/inferential benefit to interacting with similar
others, that would be harder to obtain from social attitudes
alone?
In synthesis, this study asks three questions. The main one
is whether perceived similarities can have an impact on tacit
coordination. The second is whether this impact is the same in
coordination environments requiring players to either match or
decouple their choices. The third asks what aspect of similarity
might guide coordination: the fact that agents simply “like”
similar others, or the fact that they are better at predicting
them? To shed light on these questions, we varied similarity and
liking independently and assessed their separate contributions
to coordination problems involving strategic complements and
substitutes.
10Incidentally, in English, the same word can be used to express both concepts: “we
like those who are like us.”
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Methods
The Games
We used two types of (two-player) coordination games: “Stag
Hunts” (SHs) and “Entry Games” (EGs), which have been
extensively studied, both in theory and experimental settings
(reviewed in Camerer, 2003). In our versions—adapted from
Heinemann et al. (2009)—we attempted to keep the superficial
aspects of the two games as similar as possible, so that any
behavioral difference would be due to their structural (incentive-
related) differences. The two games were played in randomized
order, and were as follows: in both, two agents had to choose
between the same two options: (1) a potentially high paying
but uncertain payoff (“UP”), always worth either $/e15.00 or
0; and (2) a lower paying but safe payoff (“SP”), worth a given
$ amount (with SP ≤ 15.00). Both games capture a frequent
situation, namely, that low gains can be obtained safely in
isolation, while high paying outcomes involve coordination and
uncertainty. Indeed, in both games, if the SP was chosen, it was
obtained for sure, regardless the choice of one’s counterpart.
On the other hand, the outcome of choosing the UP depended
on the choice of one’s counterpart, and on the game: in SHs,
$15.00 were obtained, by both players, if, and only if, both chose
the uncertain option; thus, if only one chose the UP, he or she
obtained 0. In EGs, on the other hand, the high gain could
only be obtained in isolation, thus if both players chose the
potentially high paying UP, both obtained 0. It follows that in
SHs, the incentives induce players to attempt and match their
choices (either both “risk” and choose the UP, or neither should,
but mismatching is costly), while in EGs, players should try to
decouple their choices (such that either one player “risks” and
the other doesn’t, or vice versa, but players should not risk
together). Then, by progressively increasing the value of the SP
and having participants choose at each (randomized) step we
obtained a measure of their uncertainty in the two games; that
is, of their willingness to choose the uncertain option, over the
lower but certain one. Importantly, since initial coordination
patterns usually determine the outcome of their repeated versions
(Heinemann et al., 2004), and since we were here interested in
the way social distance biases choices rather than how it may
bias learning, no feedback on the outcomes of decisions was
provided until the end of the experiment. Notably, this set up
enabled to compare two very different games by visually altering
only a minor detail. Indeed, both games presented (a list of)
the SP magnitudes on one side of the screen and the fixed
high payoff ($15.00) on the other. The games were thus only
differentiated by what was written under the high payoff. The SH
condition read, “$15.00 only if 2,” and the EG read, “$15.00 if at
most 1” (see the instructions in the Supplementary Material for
snapshots).
Similarity Induction
Similarity was manipulated by making participants play with
counterparts that were either similar or dissimilar to them.
The similarity between players and counterparts was based
on the match (similarity condition) or mismatch (dissimilarity
condition) of identification ratings (on a scale from 1 to 7) with
a group of (three) adjectives describing personality traits. These
groups of adjectives were obtained as follows: before participants
knew about the games, they rated 100 adjectives describing
personality traits. They did so twice: once, indicating how much
they identified with a given trait (“ID”), and the second, how
much they liked the same trait (“Like”) (in counterbalanced
order). As soon as they finished, an algorithm (see Table 2 in the
Supplementary Material for details) went through the identity
and liking ratings of each of the 100 words and retrieved four
groups of words (three words per group) for each participant: (1)
the first group was composed of words that a given participant
both strongly identified with and strongly liked (i.e., maximizing
both liking and identity ratings) (“ID+_Like+”); (2) the second
group consisted of words that were identified with but disliked
(“ID+ Like−”); (3) the third group, of words that were liked
but not identified with (“ID- Like+”); while (4) the fourth and
last group was composed of words that were not identified with
and were disliked (“ID- Like−”) (see Figure 1). Participants
then were told that they would have interacted with several
anonymous counterparts and that matched counterparts would
have been mutually informed of how they identified with a same
group of person-descriptive words. This was made known to
participants by the use of rating bars (see Figure 1 below for the
design; or Figure 4 in the instructions for a screenshot of the
actual task—Supplementary Material).
Ideally, we would have preferred to not deceive participants,
though our design made this difficult. The main problem was
that there were relatively few words, for each participant, that
satisfied the requirements of our design (i.e., that maximized
identity and liking ratings etc.) and these rarely matched between
participants. For instance, over the 100 person-descriptive words
that participants rated, there were only few of them that each
participant maximally (minimally) identified with andmaximally
(minimally) liked (on average, 4.3 for ID+Like+ condition—
s.e. 1.7 -, and 5 for the ID-Like- condition). Furthermore,
there were even less optimal words for the “incongruent” word
conditions (on average, 1.8 and 1.6 for the ID+Like- and ID-
Like+ conditions, respectively). Within the ∼15–20 participant
sessions we ran, it was thus difficult to find two players that
actually rated the same words in similar ways. Perhaps this
could have been achieved with a much larger sample size, which
was unavailable to us. Alternatively, we could have chosen sub-
optimal words (i.e., for the ID+Like+ condition, words that
participants only weakly identified with but that were actually
shared by multiple participants), though we were concerned that
this would have reduced any effect of similarity. In sight of
these tradeoffs, we resorted to generating the identity ratings
of artificial counterparts, as this allowed us to probe for effects
of similarity while effectively controlling for identity and liking.
Finally, in order to minimize deception, before taking part in the
task of interest, participants also took part in the same two games
without knowing anything about their counterparts, and were
paid for one of these randomly determined trials. Consequently,
participants were in fact paid for their real choices and those of
their matched counterparts, though they believed that any trial
could be paid. In addition to this choice-dependent payment,
participants earned a $5.00 show-up fee.
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental design. Before taking part in the interactions of
interest, participants provided both “liking” and “identity” ratings of a set of
100 personality traits. Subsequently, they interacted with counterparts that
were either similar or dissimilar to them with respect to a selected subset of
the traits. While playing the games, matched counterparts were told that they
mutually viewed rating bars indicating whether they identified or did not
identify with the traits. “Liking+” and “Liking-” indicate that participants liked
or disliked the selected traits.
In synthesis, excluding the latter “trait-neutral” trials, this
set-up yielded a 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 design, with factors: (1)
game (SHs vs. EGs), (2) similarity (similar vs. dissimilar); (3)
liking (liked vs. disliked traits); and (4) identity (high vs. low
identification with traits). The instructions we used are available
in the Supplementary Material. Within each of the resulting 16
experimental cells, SPs ranged from 1 to 15 in steps of 1, for
a total of 240 decisions. Given this high number of decisions,
we adopted a presentation method analogous to the strategy
method (Selten, 1965), in which participants viewed all 15 SP
options of a cell on a single page, rather than making each
decision on a separate page. Each of the resulting 16 pages/cells
(with 15 decisions for each page) was presented in randomized
order.
Person-descriptive words were taken from Dumas et al.
(2002), a list of 844 person related adjectives and had been
rated on the basis of their likableness. Since we aimed to
orthogonalize identity and liking scores as much as possible,
while simultaneously inducing a sufficiently strong sense of
identification and liking, we needed words that were valenced
but not too clearly so, since traits with extreme (high or low)
valences also had the lowest likableness variance. Thus, plausibly
few people would have identified with words like “dishonest,”
but some may have identified with words such as “disorganized”
or “whiny.” Consequently, we sorted the traits on the basis of
their likableness, and took 100 words from 2 clusters: 50 from
a moderately positive cluster, and 50 from moderately negative
one.
Lottery
To control for the potential impact of inter-individual differences
in (non-strategic) risk attitudes, participants took part in a
“lottery” condition, which took place after the strategic games.
For the lottery task, participants were endowed with $5.00
additional dollars and were then allowed to make an investment
on a lottery extraction with a winning probability of 2/3.
Participants could invest any amount (0 included) of their $5.00
endowment. To implement the lottery, in clear sight of all, we
placed two red balls and one blue ball (of equal dimension) into a
hole on the top of an opaque box, and shook it. Participants were
informed that, after placing their bets, a randomly designated
participant would have blindly extracted a single ball from
the box. If the ball was red the experimenters would have
doubled participants’ investments, while if the ball was blue, the
investment would have been lost. We took the amount invested
by each participant as a measure of their (non-strategic)-risk
attitudes.
Participants
The experiment was carried out at the University of Southern
California. In 5 sessions, 68 participants took part in the 2
coordination tasks, implemented in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
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Procedures
Participants interacted in groups, from individually shielded
computer cubicles. After assigning them to a random cubicle
(via a bingo chip extraction), instructions were read out loud
and followed on instruction sheets. Before starting, participants
also took part in a questionnaire that probed their understanding
of the games. The questionnaire could only be completed by
correctly responding to all of its items. This enabled us to
explicitly assure participants that they, and all their potential
counterparts, had understood the rules of the games. All
procedures were approved by local ethical committees. Our data
is available upon request.
Statistical Analysis
Data was analyzed with generalized linear mixed effects models
(“GLMMs”: Bolker et al., 2009), with a “bobyqa” optimization
algorithm (Powell, 2009), as implemented in the lme4 package
(Baayen et al., 2008), in the R environment (Venables and Smith,
2005).
Analysis of Choice
Since our principle dependent variable was the dichotomous
choice “SP” or “UP” (i.e., “risk”) we used a GLMM with
a logistic link function (as also done in Heinemann et al.,
2009). Our main question of interest was whether similarity
affected choices oppositely in coordination games that required
participants to either match (SHs) or decouple their choices
(EGs), and whether this depended on how much participants
liked or identified with the personality characteristics that the
similarity was based on. Correspondingly, our model included
the four-way interaction between the following fixed-effect terms:
game∗similarity∗liking∗identity (which automatically included
all lower-level interactions). Furthermore, as previous research
(Nagel et al., in preparation) has shown that decreasing SPs
affects the likelihood of “risking” differentially in SHs and
EGs, we added an additional interaction term between these
two factors as a covariate. Finally, since Heinemann et al.
(2009) have shown that (non-strategic) risk attitudes (i.e., as
established by lotteries with known probabilities) are related to
“risk” in strategic games, we further introduced the (centered)
investments participants had made in the lottery condition
(“lottery”), and let this interact with the game factor. In synthesis,
our model included the following fixed effect terms: sure
payoff ∗game+ game∗similarity∗liking∗identity+ lottery∗game.
At last, our model included a random intercept term to cluster
choices by participant. We report the analysis of variance table
of this model in the Supplementary Table 1. Then, to inspect the
significant interaction constituents (when significant), we simply
re-ran the model while resetting the reference point of the factor
levels of interest (i.e., as also done in Kanngiesser et al., 2010).
Analysis of Expected Payoffs
As noted above, our participants were only allegedly paid for
one randomly determined trial. However, to study the potential
economic impact of similarity across SPs and conditions, we
computed “expected payoffs” for all trials. To do so we did the
following: in any condition, had a participant “i” chosen the SP,
the specific value of the SP was attributed to i (since, in both
games, if one chose the SP, this was obtained nomatter what one’s
counterpart chose). If however, on a different trial, i had chosen
the UP (i.e., to “risk”), then i’s payoff was determined in expected
value (“EV”), given the posterior probability of being matched to
someone else that also chose the UP in the same game11 . For
instance, suppose that in a given trial participant i chose to risk
and 70% of the other players ended up doing so as well. Then, had
the trial been a SH, i’s expected payoff, was computed as 0.7∗15.00
[i.e., EVi = 0.7∗15+0∗(1 - 0.7)], while had the trial been an EG, it
was simply computed as (1 - 0.7)∗15.00. In this way, we were able
to compute expected payoffs in all trials and explore how they
varied as a function of similarity.
Analysis of Coordination Rates
We define “successful coordination” as the probability of
“matching choices” (on either of the two options) in thematching
environment, and of decoupling choices in the decoupling one.
Notably, this notion of coordination ability needn’t have a 1-
to-1 relation with expected payoffs. For instance, if participants
had always chosen the SP in the matching environment, they
would have achieved a maximum coordination rate (according
to the definition above). Moreover, they would have obtained
the same (maximum) coordination rate by always choosing the
“risky” option. However, they would have earned much more in
the second case, coordination rates being equal. Consequently, in
addition to expected payoffs, we aimed to assess how similarity
affected the probability of successful coordination.
To compute the probability of successful coordination we did
the following: if a given participant “i” had chosen the “risky”
option in the matching environment, then his/her probability
of successful coordination it coincided with the (posterior)
likelihood of being matched to someone who had also chosen
the risky option in the corresponding condition (and for the
same SP-value)12. Conversely, in the decoupling environment,
if a subject had chosen the “risky” option, likelihood of
successful coordination was computed as the mean of potential
counterparts who had not chosen the “risky” option. In a
specular fashion, if a participant had chosen the “safe” option
in the matching game, it coincided with the average amount
of potential counterparts who had also chosen the safe option
in the corresponding condition; while, if one chose the safe
option in the decoupling environment it coincided with themean
“risk rates” of one’s counterparts. In this manner we computed
the probability of “successful coordination” for each choice
11More specifically, the choices of one’s “average counterpart” were taken from
the same experimental cell only for the similarity conditions. In the dissimilarity
condition this did not seem justified. For instance, when coordinating with a
dissimilar other in the Like+ID+ condition (or the Like+ID-, Like-ID+, and
Like-ID- conditions), participants were matched with someone with who did not
identify in the same triplet of traits, thus of someone in the Like+ID- (“dissimilar”)
condition (and respectively, the Like+ID-, Like-ID-, and Like-ID+ conditions),
not of someone in the Like+ID+ (“dissimilar”) condition. Correspondingly,
averaged counterpart choices in the dissimilarity condition only were re-mapped
as just described.
12In other words, the probability of successfully coordinating with others, when
one chose the risky option, coincided with the “mean risk rate” of one’s potential
counterparts.
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participants made (given the actual choices of all the others), and
we investigated how this was affected by similarity.
Results
Similarity Manipulation Validation
As was to be expected, we observed a positive correlation between
identity and liking ratings of the 100 adjectives (r = 0.57, p <
0.001) (Figure 2, blue), suggesting that subjects usually like the
traits they identify with or dislike the traits they don’t identify
with. In spite of this, all four groups of adjectives retrieved by
our algorithm could be differentiated (Figure 2, black circles):
averaged identity ratings within triplets were significantly higher
for the ID+ group than the ID- group (p < 0.001), and liking
ratings were higher in the Like+ group than the Like- group (p <
0.001). For the trait triplets meant to have coherent identification
and liking scores (namely, ID+Like+ and ID-Like-), ratings
between the two dimensions (identity and liking) were not
differentiable (both ps > 0.08)13 While for “incoherent” triplets,
in which liking and identity were pitted one against the other, the
two scores strongly dissociated in the anticipated directions (both
ps< 0.001)14. However, given the aforementioned correlation,
liking and identity scores also slightly changed when passing
from the coherent clusters (ID+Like+ and ID-Like-) to the
13ID+Like+: mean difference (ID - Liking)= 0.04, p> 0.3; ID-Like- (ID - Liking)
= 0.07, 95% CI [− 0.007 0.1], p= 0.08.
14ID-Like+: mean difference (ID – Liking) = -3.4, p < 0.001; ID+Like- (ID –
Liking): 3.7, p < 0.001.
incoherent ones (ID-Like+ and ID+Like-). For instance, liked
adjectives that subjects didn’t identify with (ID-Like+) were
certainly liked more than disliked adjectives from either of
the two “low-liking” clusters (both ps<0.001)15, however they
weren’t liked as much as those that subjects also identified
with16. To partially alleviate this residual multicollinearity of
liking and identity, we checked that the results obtained in
our statistical model held when using the centered identity and
liking scores, rather than the corresponding (i.e., “high vs. low”)
factors.
Behavior in Games
A logistic generalized mixed effects model was fit to the data
and no observations were excluded from the analysis. The model
revealed a significant 4-way interaction between the factors game,
similarity, identity, and liking (X2 = 5.046, p < 0.05) (see Table
1 in Supplementary Material). This suggests that similarity had
a differential impact on choices depending on its characteristics
and on whether choices had to be matched or decoupled. The
direction of the interaction constituents was as anticipated:
when traits were both liked and identified (ID+Like+) similarity
significantly increased the probability of “risky” choices in SHs
(p < 0.001)17 but decreased it in EGs (p < 0.05)18 (Figure 3,
15Mean difference in liking (ID-Like+) – (ID+Like-) = 3.7, p < 0.001; mean
difference in liking (ID-Like+) – (ID-Like-)= 4.4, p < 0.001.
16Mean difference in liking (ID-Like+ - ID+Like+)= −1, p < 0.001.
17Log-likelihood difference(sim−dissim) = 0.54, s.e.= 0.12.
18Log-likelihood difference(sim−dissim) =−0.22, s.e.= 0.11.
FIGURE 2 | Identity and liking ratings of 100 personality traits by 68
participants (on a 1–7 Likert scale). Darker blue indicates more frequent
observations, which can be clearly seen to fall on the diagonal, indicating that
subjects usually identify with the traits they like, and vice versa. Of the 100
traits each subject rated, an algorithm selected four subject-specific triplets
of adjectives that best fit into the four corners of this “identification-by-liking”
space. Black circle sizes are proportional to the number of adjectives that
were selected by the algorithm. During the subsequent games, subjects
were matched with others that either identified or didn’t identify with the
triplet of traits selected by the algorithm.
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FIGURE 3 | The impact of similarity on coordination games
requiring players to either match their choices (“strategic
complements” – “Stag hunt” games) or decouple them (“strategic
substitutes” – “Entry” games) without communicating. Curves
represent estimated probabilities of choosing a potentially higher paying,
but uncertain payoff (y-axis) (“UP”), given increasing values of a safe
alternative (x-axis), when interacting with either similar or dissimilar
(anonymous) counterparts. Similarity was based solely on the fact that
counterparts similarly identified (or did not identify) with three
personality-descriptive words. Estimates were obtained with a generalized
logistic mixed model. Error bands represent 95% confidence bands for
the fixed effects. Points are the observed percentages of UP choices.
Stars indicate significant effects of similarity on the estimated probability
of making a risky choice *p < 0.05, ***p < 0.001.
top left panel). Notably, neither of these effects was observed
when similarity was based on traits that were liked but not
identified with (i.e., “we’re both not organized” vs. “I’m not
organized, you are”) (ID-Like+) (p = 0.22)19, or when similarity
was based on traits that were identified with but disliked
(i.e., “we’re both neurotic” vs. “I’m neurotic, you are not”)
(ID+Like-) (p = 0.91)20 (see Figure 3, top right and bottom left
panels).
Expected Payoff
Importantly, similarity not only affected choices, but it affected
expected payoffs as well. Indeed, especially when personality
traits were liked and identified with (liking∗similarity∗identity
interaction: p < 0.05), we observed a positive effect of similarity
on payoffs, in both the SHs ($0.50, s.e.= 0.14, p < 0.001) and the
EGs ($0.14, s.e.= 0.05, p < 0.01).
19SH(sim−dissim) = 0.05, s.e.= 0.11, p = 0.44; EG(sim−dissim) =−0.13, s.e.=−0.11,
p = 0.22.
20SH(sim−dissim): −0.17, s.e. = 0.11, p = 0.13; EG(sim−dissim): −0.01, s.e. = 0.11,
p = 0.91.
Probability of Successful Coordination
Focusing on the condition in which we observed a significant
effect of similarity on choice (the “ID+Like+” condition)21,
we found that, in the matching environment participants in
the similarity condition were indeed more likely to match
their choices than in the dissimilarity condition (p < 0.001),
especially when choosing the “risky” option. However, similarity
did not increase coordination in the decoupling environment,
that is, similar counterparts were not “better” at decoupling
their choices than dissimilar ones (p = 0.23). More specifically,
we found that this was due to the fact that, restricting the
comparison of “coordination rates” to “safe choices” only,
participants in the similarity condition were nearly worse
at decoupling their choices than those in the dissimilarity
condition (p = 0.07), that is, they “should have” entered
more frequently. On the “flip side” of this, when restricting the
same comparison to “risky choices,” participants in the similarity
21In fact, a model including all the conditions revealed a significant 3-way
interaction between similarity, liking, and identity (p < 0.05), in determining
coordination rates.
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condition were more likely to successfully decouple their choices
(p < 0.01).
Covariates: Game, Sure Payoff, and Risk
Attitudes
As expected, our model estimated that the likelihood of making
a “risky” decision was roughly 23% lower when choices had to
be decoupled (EGs) rather than when they had to be matched
(SHs) (p < 0.001), suggesting a relative propensity for matching
choices, rather than decoupling them (regardless of similarity).
In spite of this, uncertainty in SHs was far from absent. Indeed,
while participants readily chose the uncertain option when the
alternative safe payoffs were low, they gradually ceased to do
so as safe payoffs increased (log odds of slope = −0.51, s.e. =
0.01, p < 0.001). Specifically, participants appeared indifferent
between the two options when the sure payoff was roughly 2/3
of what they could have earned by choosing the uncertain option
together (average indifference point = $9.98). Correspondingly,
increasing SP values linearly decreased expected payoff as well
(p < 0.001). Finally, risk attitudes as established from our
lottery condition did explain some of this variance. Indeed,
the more participants invested in the lotteries, the more likely
they were to choose the uncertain option in the EG only
(game∗risk interaction: p < 0.001). However, the reported
effects of similarity were net of the effect of all of these
covariates.
Discussion
Across across ages (Meltzoff, 2007), cultures (Apicella et al.,
2012), and species (Massen and Koski, 2014) similarity has been
shown to play a fundamental role in the formation of social ties
and networks (McPherson et al., 2001; Ames, 2004;Mitchell et al.,
2006; Fischer, 2009; Krueger et al., 2012; Fischer et al., 2013).
Coordination problems have also perplexed decision theorists
for decades (Schelling, 1960; Cooper et al., 1990; Van Huyck
et al., 1990; Camerer, 2003; Heinemann et al., 2009). Yet no
study has investigated whether classic coordination problems are
affected by perceived interpersonal similarities (Cole and Teboul,
2004).
In this study we investigated this by having participants
decide whether to take a number of real financial risks (as
opposed to a safe alternative), when tacitly coordinating their
choices with counterparts who were either similar or dissimilar
to them with regards to three person-descriptive words. We
report three novel findings: (1) in coordination games with
strategic compliments, in which participants had an incentive to
match their choices (stag hunts), similar counterparts incurred
higher financial “risks” than dissimilar counterparts; (2) however,
in games with strategic substitutes, where participants were to
decouple their choices (entry games), we observed the opposite
pattern: similar counterparts were willing to incur less risk than
dissimilar ones; (3) both of these effects were only observed when
similarity was based on traits that participants also liked and
identified with. We would like to comment on each of these
findings in turn.
Similarity and “Complementarity”: Propensity for
Matching Choices
Coordination games with strategic complementarities are not just
a major theoretical problem for game theory (Camerer, 2003)
they could also be a pragmatic one. The problem is that even
in situations that present clear economic synergies to all players
(i.e., typical “win-win” situations like stag hunts22), coordination
still often fails (Cooper et al., 1990). Indeed, especially when the
“risk” involved is high (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988)—that is, when
the safe alternative to coordinating becomes large enough—
coordination almost always fails (Cooper et al., 1992; Heinemann
et al., 2009)23. Seemingly, this occurs because, even though all
players would prefer to coordinate on the higher paying option24,
they fear that their counterparts might not do the same25. Our
results suggest that perceived interpersonal similarities could
then provide the assurance26 players need in order to coordinate
more efficiently: “I wish to choose the optimal option, and if my
counterpart is like me he/she is more likely to do so as well.”
Notably, in our experimental design, similarity/dissimilarity
was only based on self-reported identification with three trait-
related words, and one could sensibly argue that this is no basis
for a reliable estimate of similarity (or at least not enough to incur
different financial risks for). In spite of this, even such a partial or
occasional form of similarity proved sufficient to affect economic
coordination. In fact, humans appear particularly sensitive to
similarity-related cues, even to ones that are completely unrelated
to the task at hand. For instance, notorious minimal-group
paradigms have repeatedly shown how in-group favoritism and
out-group discrimination in games can emerge even when the
only thing that ingroups have in common is having preferred
a painting of Kandinsky over Klee (Billig and Tajfel, 1973; or
more recently, Chen and Li, 2009), rather than having over or
under counted a number of dots on a screen (Gerard and Hoyt,
1974). In line with this, even non-social similarity (or “content
free similarity”) has been shown to impact social inferences and
perspective taking (Todd et al., 2010), as well as behavior in games
(Mussweiler and Ockenfels, 2013)27. It thus appears that subjects
can pick up on similarity-related cues rather easily and that they
22Camerer (2003) calls the stag hunt game “the building block of economic
situations with “strategic complementarities.”
23A potential parallel observation in prisoner’s dilemma games is Rapoport’s “game
difficulty index” (Rapoport, 1967), which predicts higher cooperation depending
on the ratio between payoff magnitudes of the “cooperate” or “defect” outcomes.
This was a curious and early finding because, according to game theory, subjects
should always defect in (one-shot) prisoner’s dilemmas, thus “risk” should have
nothing to do with it.
24In fact, when players can communicate their intentions to one another, they
do coordinate on the higher paying option, even when they know that their
“promises” are non-binding (Cooper et al., 1992).
25Furthermore, players might not only be afraid that their counterparts will not
coordinate on the payoff efficient outcome (i.e., a 1st order belief), but they might
also think that their counterparts fear the same about them (i.e., a 2nd order belief),
and so forth (for higher order beliefs). This can generate what Hofstadter calls
“reverberating doubt” (Hofstadter, 1985).
26Stag hunts are also called “assurance games” (Camerer, 2003).
27For example, in one study (Todd et al., 2010), participants were divided into
two groups, both of which were shown a pair of images of landscapes. One group
had to list the similarities between the two images while the other group had to
list the dissimilarities. The two groups then underwent a number of social tasks
involving other agents. One of the tasks, for instance, required participants to
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often then generalize them to unrelated domains28. Notably, a
large meta-analysis on similarity (Montoya et al., 2008) suggests
that, at least with respect to “relationship quality,” perceived
similarities can even be more important than actual similarities,
and this, in principle, could hold for coordination as well.
In line with this, we found that even our weak form of
similarity not only decreased subjective uncertainty in stag hunts,
but it also increased the expected payoff of the interactions.
It follows that had the games been repeated, such similarity-
related behaviors and cognitions could have been potentially
been reinforced; and though this would be a matter for further
experimentation, it opens the possibility that, regardless of
whether generalizations of similarity are valid or invalid29, they
could be adaptive in coordination environments with strategic
complementarities.
Similarity and Substitutability: Aversion to
Decoupling Choices
Our hypothesis that similarity would provide assurance in stag
hunt games was based on the following paraphrased inference: “I
wish to choose the optimal option, and if my counterpart is like
me he/she is more likely to do so as well.” However, and critically,
while such a line of inference would indeed generate assurance in
stag hunts, it could even increase uncertainty in games involving
strategic substitutes, such as entry games. Indeed, in such games,
if both participants choose their own optimal outcomes, they
both obtain nothing at all. Our findings are in line with this: while
similar players took more “risk” than dissimilar players in stag
hunts, the opposite was true for entry games: similar counterparts
took less risk than dissimilar ones.
Even though the direct comparison has seldom been made in
the literature, previous findings suggest that games with strategic
substitutes elicit higher uncertainty than games with strategic
compliments (Chark and Chew, 2013). For instance, Camerer
and Karjalainen (1994) found that players exhibited an aversion
to uncertainty when they were to decouple their choices (i.e.,
because their payoffs were anti-correlated), while Fox andWeber
(2002) observed a relative propensity for uncertainty when
players had to match them (in a coordination game involving
correlated payoffs). This could be related to the notion that stag
hunts and entry games differ in amount of required deliberation
and recursive thinking (Nagel et al., in preparation). In line with
this, we find that, regardless of similarity, players clearly choose
neglect their own (privileged) knowledge, in order to correctly infer the false-
beliefs of a naïve target. Surprisingly, participants in the similarity condition had
more difficulties in doing so, thus systematically (over-) attributing their own
thoughts and perspectives to others.
28In spite of this, we don’t expect similarity to always affect inferences, especially
when it conflicts with other forms of relevant information. For instance, knowing
that someone is very “risk-averse” would be arguably relevant to predicting his
or her behavior in games involving some form of uncertainty. Consequently, we
would expect similarity to no longer raise risk rates in stag hunts if it was, for
instance, based on the fact that two players are similar in their “risk-aversion.”
Similarities might also need to be salient enough, like groupmembership in related
paradigms (Charness et al., 2006; Chen and Li, 2009).
29The case has often been made (Dawes, 1989; Krueger, 2008; Krueger et al., 2012)
that some egocentric biasesmay actually not be biases at all, but the result of correct
Bayesian inferences that are based on a sample size of 1 (i.e. one’s own opinion,
preferences or attitude).
the uncertain option less frequently in entry games than stag
hunts (see Figure 330) and that they choose it even less when they
play entry games with similar counterparts.
A second important difference between stag hunts and entry
games is that the standard notion of mixed strategy equilibrium
(“MSE”) works very poorly for stag hunts but very well for entry
games (Camerer and Fehr, 2006)31. For example, in an entry
game with SP = 1, (risk-neutral) players are in MSE, only if 93%
of them are “entering” (i.e., choosing the UP). Indeed, if a given
player “i” believed that 93% of (non-i) agents were entering in
such a game (or, equivalently, that a single counterpart “j” entered
with a probability of 0.93), his expected earning for entering as
well would be equal to the high payoff ($15.00) multiplied by
the probability of being matched to someone who did not enter;
that is, (1 - 0.93)∗15.00=$1.00. As one can see, for this specific
probability only (p = 0.93), the expected value of entering
is equivalent to the amount player i would obtain for sure by
choosing the SP option. Consequently, for this expected entry
rate (of other players), an agent would be indifferent between the
two options, thus in equilibrium.
Naturally, this reasoning would seem futile because players
have little information on which to base their probability
estimates in one-shot entry games, so how can they decide
who should enter and who choose the certain option? Yet,
without communication, or trial and error, groups of players are
known to “split up” in proportions that are very similar to those
predicted by MSE (Camerer and Fehr, 2006; reviewed in Erev
and Rapoport, 1998). Indeed, we observed this in our data as
well: aggregating choices across participants, we found that MSE-
based probabilities (computed for each SP32) predicted very well
the proportions in which participants “split up” between entering
and non-entering (r = 0.97, p < 0.001) (“To a psychologist”
Daniel Kahneman said, “it looks like magic”) (Kahneman, 1988).
To this we make one addition: since MSE outcomes are
actually rather inefficient in terms of payoffs33, and similarity
lowered entry rates, similarity can actually increase the expected
payoffs in entry games. In other words, since similarity
generally lowered entry rates (in the ID+Like+ condition), the
relatively fewer participants that did enter had a sufficiently
high probability of being matched to someone who had not
entered; high enough to significantly grant a payoff advantage
of similarity. Notably, this occurred in spite of the fact
30The two entry game curves are lower than the two stag hunt ones.
31MSE assumes that players choose options with a given probability, rather than
choosing each strategy with dichotomous probability (i.e., p = 1 or p = 0)—as
in “pure strategy” equilibrium. For instance, in the game of “rock, paper scissors,”
there is only one mixed-strategy equilibrium, which is for both players to choose
each strategy with a probability of 1/3 (Cook et al., 2012). In fact, if a player adopted
any other probability distribution over his/her choices this would be exploited by
a rational counterpart, thus leading the first player to revert back to a uniform
distribution.
32We computedMSE solutions, for each SP value by solving for the “Pj (UP)” term
in the following equation: SP= (1 - Pj (UP))∗15.00; where Pj (UP) is the posterior
probability of being matched with a counterpart who also chose the UP on the
target trial.
33For instance, in a hypothetical EG with SP = 0 MSE would predict all “rational”
agents to enter, “collide” with one another and thus to all earn 0. Consequently,
many deviations from this inefficient equilibrium can raise average expected
payoffs.
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that similarity did not increase participants’ general ability
to decouple their choices (while it did favor matching in
the matching environment). We thus suspect that similarity
might have “indirectly” increased expected payoffs in decoupling
environments, more as a result of increased uncertainty (i.e.,
lowered entry rates), rather than as a result of increased
decoupling abilities.
At any rate, our findings show how similarity can potentially
increase expected payoffs of interactions over the two opposite
poles of coordination: matching and decoupling. This could shed
light on why homophily is so successful as a social attractor.
The Impact of Similarity on Coordination: Not
Just Social Preferences
As illustrated by Cooper et al. (1990), “a weakness of the
Nash equilibrium concept is that it may not generate a unique
equilibrium. In this case it must be augmented by a hypothesis
refining the beliefs of players about the strategies selected by their
opponents” [cursive our own]. So far, we have treated perceived
similarities as affecting precisely the beliefs or inferences of
players in coordination environments: if similarity leads players
to believe they are more likely to make similar choices, this
should decrease uncertainty when choices are to bematched (stag
hunts), but increase it when they are to be decoupled (entry
games).
However, this interpretation faces a potentially important
confound. Indeed, as we illustrated in the introduction of this
paper, similarity has primarily been considered to increase
interpersonal attraction (Byrne, 1971; McPherson et al., 2001)
and a social preferences approach (Van Lange, 1999; Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2003) could in principle explain our findings
without recurring to inferences or beliefs at all. In fact, under
the latter view, participants would simply “prefer” similar to
dissimilar others and consequently choose the options that
benefit similar targets more than dissimilar ones. In line with
this, it can be demonstrated for our two games that if payoff
interdependencies are introduced—such that one’s subjective
utility is assumed to be proportional to the payoff of one’s
counterpart (in addition to his/her own)—then the expected
value of “risking” (relative to the alternative sure payoff) increases
in SHs, but decreases in EGs, which is in fact the behavioral
pattern we observe34.
However, our design enabled to address this potential
confound. Specifically we found that similarity only affected
coordination when the traits on which it was based on were
also liked and identified with (our ID+Like+ condition).
Importantly, had this effect been due to “liking” alone, we should
have observed the reversed pattern of similarity in the ID+Like-
or ID-Like+ conditions. In fact, in these conditions, dissimilar
others were characterized by traits that the participants liked,
whereas similar others were not (ID-Like+); or dissimilar others
did not identify with traits that participants disliked, while similar
34Put differently, if one makes no inferences at all and simply wishes to choose the
option that maximally benefits his/her counterpart, this option is the uncertain one
in stag hunts, and the certain one in the entry game. Indeed, if one always made
these respective choices in the two games, their counterparts would never lose.
counterparts did (ID+Like-). Had the effect of similarity in
the ID+Like+ condition been due to liking alone, we should
have thus found that risk rates were higher when participants
coordinated with dissimilar others in stag hunts, and higher for
similar others in entry games. However, neither of these effects
was observed. This suggests that our observed effect of similarity
on coordination was not due to liking alone.
Conclusion
According to Quine (1969), “There is nothing more basic
to thought and language than our sense of similarity”35
and psychologists have long insisted that, since early stages
of development (Meltzoff, 2007), similarity could provide a
fundamental window on to the minds of others (Ames, 2004;
Robbins and Krueger, 2005; Goldman, 2006; Krueger et al.,
2012). Indeed, the finding that similarity breeds attraction has
been called “one of the most robust relationships in all of the
behavioral sciences” (Berger, 1973). In spite of this, no study
had investigated the impact of perceived similarities on tacit
coordination.
Here, we demonstrated that agents are willing to incur higher
financial risks when they are to coordinate their choices with
similar others. However, we find that this effect is specific to
coordination environments in which all agents would prefer to
match their choices. In fact, when agents should decouple their
choices, we observe the opposite effect; namely, similar others
take less financial risks than dissimilar ones. On the basis of this,
we suggest that perceived interpersonal similarities can indeed be
used as a coordination device and that they can both decrease
and increase strategic uncertainty, depending on the incentives
at play. Furthermore, we find that when similarity is removed
from interpersonal attraction, its impact on coordination is much
decreased, if at all present. At last, our finding that perceived
interpersonal similarities can increase the collected expected
payoffs of agents might shed light on why homophily, or “love
for similar others,” is so successful as a social attractor.
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